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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Thomas Cruz Colvin appeals from the district court’s order denying his 
motion to dismiss. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Colvin battered his girlfriend and was cited for misdemeanor domestic 
battery.  (R., pp. 15, 64.)  The state moved to dismiss the charge, stating in its 
written motion that “it is in the interest of justice to do so.”  (R., p. 65.)  The 
district court granted the state’s motion and dismissed the charge without 
prejudice.  (R., p. 67.) 
 The state then filed a new complaint based on the incident.  (R., pp. 6-7.)  
The new complaint alleged that Colvin inflicted a traumatic injury upon his 
girlfriend, and therefore charged the incident as a felony domestic battery. 
(R., p. 6.) 
 Colvin moved to dismiss.  (R., pp. 45-46.)  He argued that because the 
state previously dismissed a misdemeanor based on the same incident, Idaho 
Code Section 19-3506 barred the filing of subsequent charges for the “same 
offense.”  (R., p. 60.)  Colvin argued that “the dismissal of the misdemeanor case 
created a bar to any other prosecution of the Defendant for any offense based 
on the same events or transaction that formed the basis of the dismissed 
charge”—regardless of whether the new charge was a misdemeanor or a felony.  
(R., pp. 59-60.)  The state responded that felony and misdemeanor domestic 
violence charges are not the same offense, and that moreover, I.C. § 19-3506 
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would only bar the state from filing repeat misdemeanors arising from the same 
events.  (R., pp. 74-76.) 
 The district court, applying the test from Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299 (1932), concluded that the charges of misdemeanor and felony 
domestic violence were the “same offense.”  (R., pp. 82-84.)  However, the court 
went on to find that the statute would only bar prosecution for the same offense if 
the subsequent charge was a misdemeanor: 
The Court views the statute to read as follows: an order for the 
dismissal of the action, as provided in this chapter, is a bar to any 
other prosecution for the same offense, if the subsequent 
prosecution is a misdemeanor; but the order for dismissal is not 
a bar if the offense, as identified in the new prosecution, is a 
felony. 
 
(R., p. 88 (emphasis in original).)  The district court concluded that “because 
Colvin’s subsequent charge was a felony charge (regardless of the fact that the 
original charge was a misdemeanor) the order of dismissal will not act as a bar to 
the State bringing the new charges.”  (R., p. 88.) 
 The district court denied Colvin’s motion to dismiss.  (R., p. 89.)  Colvin 
ultimately pleaded guilty, receiving a withheld judgment, but reserved his right to 
appeal the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.  (R., pp. 100-01, 104-08.)  He 
timely appealed.  (R., pp. 111-12.) 
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ISSUE 
 
Colvin states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Whether, because Idaho case law is clear that when a 
misdemeanor charge is dismissed I.C. § 19-3506 bars any new 
prosecution for the same offense, the district court erred when it 
denied Mr. Colvin’s motion to dismiss. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Colvin failed to show that Idaho Code Section 19-3506 would bar 
prosecution for felony domestic battery following the dismissal of a misdemeanor 
domestic battery charge based on the same acts? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Pursuant To Idaho Supreme Court Precedent, Idaho Code Section 19-3506 
Does Not Bar Prosecution Of A Subsequently Filed Felony Based On The Same 
Acts As A Dismissed Misdemeanor 
 
A. Introduction 
 Colvin argues “when a misdemeanor charge is dismissed, I.C. § 19-3506 
prevents any other prosecution for the same offense, regardless of whether the 
newly-filed charge is classified as a misdemeanor or a felony.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 5 (underlining and capitalization omitted).)  Colvin contends that the 
misdemeanor and felony here are the same offense because “[t]he charges were 
both based on the same facts,” and accordingly argues that Section 19-3506 
barred the filing of the misdemeanor.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6, n. 4.) 
These arguments fail because the Idaho Supreme Court has expressly 
stated that the language of Section 19-3506 does not bar prosecuting a higher 
offense based on the same acts as a dismissed lower-level offense.  State v. 
McKeehan, 49 Idaho 531, 289 P. 993 (1930).1  Consequently, the statute would 
not bar the filing of a felony following the dismissal of a misdemeanor based on 
the same acts.  Colvin’s arguments for applying a different standard are 
unconvincing; thus, application of the law to the facts show that I.C. § 19-3506 
did not bar the felony charge here. 
                                            
1 While the McKeehan Court was construing the prior codification of the statute, 
found at Idaho Comp. S. § 9181, the operative language of the current statute is 
the same.  Compare McKeehan, 289 P.2d at 994, with I.C. § 19-3506. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
 This Court freely reviews matters of statutory interpretation.  Guzman v. 
Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P.3d 918, 924 (2014). 
 
C. The Idaho Supreme Court Has Expressly Held That The Dismissal Of A 
Misdemeanor Is Not A Bar To Prosecuting A Higher Offense Based On 
The Same Acts 
 
 The Idaho Code sets forth the following with respect to dismissal acting as 
a bar: 
An order for the dismissal of the action, as provided in this chapter, 
is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense, if it is a 
misdemeanor; but it is not a bar if the offense is a felony. 
 
I.C. § 19-3506.  The Idaho Supreme Court has already decided the narrow 
question at issue here: whether this statutory bar for prosecuting a same offense 
would apply where the state has dismissed a misdemeanor and subsequently 
prosecutes a higher offense based on the same underlying act.   
In State v. McKeehan, the Court heard an appeal from a judgment of 
conviction for unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor.  49 Idaho 531,  289 P. 993.  
The defendant there was initially charged by information for the unlawful sale of 
two pints of moonshine, an indictable misdemeanor.  289 P. at 994.  A complaint 
was then filed, charging a simple misdemeanor offense of unlawful possession 
of intoxicating liquor—in other words, a new charge based on the same two 
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pints.2  See id.  Prior to trial, the new charge “was dismissed on motion of the 
prosecuting attorney.”  Id. 
Based on the misdemeanor dismissal, McKeehan mounted a familiar 
defense: 
[McKeehan] pleaded former acquittal in defense of the action at 
bar.  In behalf of this plea defendant offered proof that the 
identical two pints of moonshine relied upon in the case at bar 
constituted the sole evidence upon which the possession 
complaint was filed. 
 
The trial court instructed the jury that if the offense charged in the 
complaint, which was dismissed, was a lesser and different offense 
than that for which the defendant was on trial, then the plea of 
former acquittal would not be a bar.  The court then charged the 
jury that unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, under the 
laws of Idaho, was a lesser offense than unlawful sale of 
intoxicating liquor. The Jury also found against the defendant on 
the plea of acquittal. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  On appeal, McKeehan renewed his argument, claiming 
that his plea for acquittal should have been upheld because the jury “found the 
state relied upon the same identical liquor as the foundation or corpus of each 
case made by the pleadings.”  Id. 
                                            
2 The difference between a simple misdemeanor and an indictable misdemeanor 
is explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Gibbs v. Shaud, which noted that 
crimes of that era were classified as felonies, misdemeanors “which could be 
tried by complaint,” or indictable misdemeanors requiring the filing of an 
indictment or information.  98 Idaho 37, 39, 557 P.2d 631, 633 (1976).  In 
McKeehan, while the Court did not explicitly state whether the possession 
offense was a misdemeanor (nor did it state which exact statute or ordinance the 
charge was based on), it noted that it was prosecuted via complaint.  Id.  This is 
in contrast to the sale offense, which the Court explicitly stated was a “higher 
offense” indictable misdemeanor, and which was prosecuted via information.  Id.  
One can only infer, based on the Shaud categories, and the McKeehan Court’s 
comments that the indictable misdemeanor was a “higher offense,” that the 
possession charge in McKeehan was a simple misdemeanor. 
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 The Idaho Supreme Court found this argument “novel,” but meritless.  Id.  
The Court began by pointing out that McKeehan’s theory relied, as does 
Colvin’s, on the statutory filing bar: “[a]n order for the dismissal of the action, as 
provided in this article, is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense, if it 
is a misdemeanor; but it is not a bar if the offense is a felony.”  Id. 
The McKeehan Court explicitly found this language, now codified as 
Section 19-3506, would not bar the prosecution of a higher-level offense based 
on the same acts.  Id.  The Court explained its reasoning step by step: 
It is argued by the defendant that this dismissal is tantamount to an 
acquittal of the acts upon which the complaint is founded.  We find 
no authority or reason for holding the dismissal goes that far.  It is 
not equivalent to a dismissal after trial.  The statute provides 
dismissal is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.  
Nothing more.  As we view the law, such a dismissal does not 
amount to an acquittal of defendant of the acts complained of.  
It is therefore not a bar to the prosecution of a higher offense, 
which may necessarily include the acts complained of as a 
basis of the action dismissed, because it does not amount to 
an acquittal, or even former jeopardy.  The state, in prosecuting 
this action and dismissing the other, simply elected to proceed on 
the more serious charge. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  The McKeehan Court accordingly affirmed the judgment 
of conviction.  Id. at 995. 
The McKeehan holding resolves the only issue on appeal.  No facts are in 
dispute and Colvin presents Section 19-3506 as his sole theory of relief.  Colvin 
argues that because the act of battering his wife was the basis for both the 
misdemeanor and the felony charges against him, the charges are the “same 
offense”; thus, he contends, the dismissal of the former should bar the latter.  
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-7.)  But the McKeehan court specifically addressed 
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such an argument and held that a prior dismissal would not bar the prosecution 
of an higher offense based on the same acts.  289 P. at 994.  While the 
McKeehan Court was comparing a misdemeanor and an indictable 
misdemeanor, there is no reason to doubt that the Court’s underlying logic would 
apply here.3  The Court couched its holding in general terms, stating that the 
statute is “not a bar to the prosecution of a higher offense, which may 
necessarily include the acts complained of as a basis to the action dismissed.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  Based on McKeehan’s plain language its holding would 
apply to any higher offense—and therefore applies here.  This Court need only 
apply the plain rule from McKeehan to find that the dismissal of Colvin’s prior 
misdemeanor domestic battery would not bar the prosecution of the felony 
domestic battery based on the same acts. 
                                            
3 The Idaho Supreme Court appeared to affirm that the McKeehan holding 
applies in misdemeanor-felony cases.  In State v. Randolph, 61 Idaho 456, 102 
P.2d 913 (1940), the Court cited McKeehan, and approvingly cited the 
appellant’s concession that a misdemeanor dismissal would not bar filing a 
felony: 
 
Conceding the prosecution should not have withdrawn its motion 
for a dismissal of the misdemeanor charge and that such 
dismissal would not have been a bar under Sec. 19-3406 I.C.A. 
to the subsequent prosecution for a felony (State v. 
McKeehan, 49 Idaho 531, 289 P. 993), appellant by his resistence 
[sic] to the motion to dismiss may not now complain because the 
misdemeanor charge was not dismissed. 
 
61 Idaho 456, 102 P.2d at 914 (emphasis added).  This further shows that the 
McKeehan holding applies to all higher-level offenses, including felonies. 
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D. Colvin Has Failed To Advance Any Proper Justification For Departing 
From Controlling Idaho Supreme Court Precedent 
 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent.  Stare decisis 
dictates that controlling precedent be followed “unless it is manifestly wrong, 
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued 
injustice.”  State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); State v. 
Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houghland 
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)). 
 On appeal, Colvin fails to give a compelling reason for this Court to depart 
from the plain-stated rule in McKeehan.  While Colvin mentions McKeehan in a 
footnote, he states that the McKeehan Court “determined the timing of the 
dismissal and filing of the new charge was a relevant consideration in the 
application” of Section 19-3506.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6, n. 3.)  Colvin seems to 
imply that the McKeehan holding is timing-dependent, applicable only in cases, 
like McKeehan, where the state files the higher-level offense first.   
However, this interpretation is belied by both McKeehan and the statute 
itself.  McKeehan did not state that the timing of the filing made any difference in 
its analysis.  See 289 P. at 994.  Rather, the core of McKeehan’s holding was 
that because the dismissal did not acquit the defendant of the underlying acts, 
dismissing the misdemeanor was “not a bar to the prosecution of a higher 
offense, which may necessarily include the acts complained of as a basis of the 
action dismissed.”  Id.  That same logic applies here.  Likewise, the statute does 
not bar the filing of a same-offense case; rather, it is a bar to prosecution.  See 
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I.C. § 19-3506.  Taken together, neither McKeehan nor the statute imply that 
McKeehan’s holding—that misdemeanor dismissal is not a bar to a higher-level 
prosecution—only applies where the state has filed the higher offense first.  
McKeehan squarely applies here, and Colvin has failed to distinguish it. 
 Colvin urges this Court interpret Section 19-3506 to mean the dismissal of 
a misdemeanor would bar any subsequent charges based on the same act, 
including felonies.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-7.)  Doing so requires this Court 
make two assumptions: 1) that “same offense” refers to any charge based on the 
same acts, regardless of any felony-misdemeanor distinction; and 2), that the 
statute’s use of “if it is a misdemeanor” specifically refers to the dismissed 
offense, and not the new one.  See I.C. § 19-3506 (emphasis added).  In other 
words, Colvin argues, the statutory bar is only triggered when the dismissed 
charge—as opposed to the newly filed charge—is a misdemeanor.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)   With these assumptions on board, Colvin proposes that 
“if the dismissed charge [is] a misdemeanor, any subsequent prosecution for the 
same offense [is] barred, but if the dismissed charge [is] a felony, the dismissal 
would not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 2.) 
 These arguments fail.  First, Colvin has not shown that a felony and a 
misdemeanor, even if based on the same underlying acts, constitute the “same 
offense” for the purposes of Section 19-3506.  Colvin summarily adopts the 
district court’s finding, based on Blockburger, that the two charges are the same 
offense.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6., n. 4 (citing R., pp. 82-84).)  But that finding was 
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incorrect.  Whether the two charges are the same offense for purposes of 
Section 19-3506 is not a double jeopardy question, because here, where no plea 
had been entered or jury empaneled, jeopardy had not yet attached.  See State 
v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 778, 979 P.2d 648, 651 (1999); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 
28, 38, 98 S. Ct. 2156, 2162, 57 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1978); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 
493, 496, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2539, 81 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1984).  Accordingly, whether 
the charges here are the same offense per Blockburger is irrelevant.     
Colvin cites to State v. Barter, 80 Idaho 552, 556, 335 P.2d 887, 889-90 
(1959), and State v. Barlow’s, Inc., 111 Idaho 958, 729 P.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1986) 
as support for his “same offense” definition, but neither case definitively states 
what “same offense” means in this context.4  Colvin further argues that his felony 
domestic battery charge was “not a separate offense” because it was a 
sentencing enhancement.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6, n. 4.)  This too is incorrect, as 
none of the factors the Schall Court identified as showing a sentencing 
 
                                            
4 Barlow’s came the closest to defining “same offense” for Section 19-3506 when 
it surveyed the buffet of possible definitional tests available to it.  See  Barlow’s, 
111 Idaho at 960-61, 729 P.2d at 435-36 (beginning the analysis by considering 
the competing approaches of defining “same offense” as “same evidence,” 
“same transaction,” or “same act or omission”).  But the Barlow’s Court never 
actually stated which test it adopted.  See generally id. Moreover, the 
conclusions the Barlow’s Court reached are unhelpful to defining “same offense,” 
because the Court appears to conflate the “same act” approach and the “same 
evidence” approach in its analysis.  See id. at 962, 729 P.2d at 437 (ambiguously 
asking whether Barlow was “prosecuted for the same act” while noting that a 
showing of “additional evidence … would also be required”).  In any event, the 
state submits that Barlow’s did not explicitly define “same offense” as “any 
charge based on the same act,” and even if it did, such a finding would be 
superseded by the contrary, controlling holding in McKeehan. 
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enhancement would apply here.  See State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 492, 
337 P.3d 647, 651 (2014).  Finally, any interpretation that equates “same 
offense” with “higher offense based on the same acts” runs counter to the 
Supreme Court’s controlling holding in McKeehan.  The McKeehan Court plainly 
considered and explicitly rejected barring higher-level offenses based on the 
same acts, and by doing so necessarily rejected a “same offense” definition 
encompassing all charges based on the same acts.  See McKeehan, 289 P. at 
994. 
Even if the charges here were the same offense, Colvin has failed to 
make the case that the statute turns on the nature of the dismissed charge as 
opposed to the newly-filed charge.  On this point, Colvin cites to cases where 
either a misdemeanor was dismissed and a misdemeanor was filed, or where a 
felony was dismissed and a felony was filed.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7); see 
also State v. Hinostroza, 114 Idaho 621, 759 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1988) (where 
the state moved to dismiss a felony DUI and then charged felony vehicular 
manslaughter); Barlow’s, Inc., 111 Idaho 958, 729 P.2d 433 (where the state 
moved to dismiss misdemeanor electrical code violations and thereafter charged 
misdemeanor electrical code violations);  State v. Barter, 80 Idaho 552, 335 P.2d 
887 (where the state moved to dismiss a misdemeanor and then filed a 
misdemeanor).  
These cases fail to shed light on the issue here.  Where the dismissed 
charge and newly-filed charge are both felonies, or both misdemeanors, one 
cannot infer that the nature of the dismissed charge alone has any special 
  13 
significance.  The state submits that in same-level offense cases, offhand 
statements regarding the dismissed charge are necessarily dicta to the question 
here: what effect the dismissal of a lower-level charge might have on a higher-
level charge.  That question has already been addressed, considered, and 
resolved by the Idaho Supreme Court in the McKeehan.  This Court should apply 
that holding and find that Section 19-3506 does not bar the filing of a felony 
based on the same acts as a dismissed misdemeanor. 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the dismissal of Colvin’s 
motion to dismiss. 
 DATED this 2nd day of March, 2017. 
 
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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